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Abstract—An important problem in the area of homeland security is to identify abnormal or suspicious entities in large data sets.
Although there are methods from data mining and social network analysis focusing on finding patterns or central nodes from networks
or numerical data sets, there has been little work aimed at discovering abnormal instances in large complex semantic graphs, whose
nodes are richly connected with many different types of links. In this paper, we describe a novel unsupervised framework to identify
such instances. Besides discovering abnormal instances, we believe that to complete the process, a system has to also provide users
with understandable explanations for its findings. Therefore, in the second part of the paper, we describe an explanation mechanism to
automatically generate human-understandable explanations for the discovered results. To evaluate our discovery and explanation
systems, we perform experiments on several different semantic graphs. The results show that our discovery system outperforms state-
of-the-art unsupervised network algorithms used to analyze the 9/11 terrorist network and other graph-based outlier detection
algorithms by a significant margin. Additionally, the human study we conducted demonstrates that our explanation system, which
provides natural language explanations for the system’s findings, allowed human subjects to perform complex data analysis in a much
more efficient and accurate manner.
Index Terms—Anomaly detection, data mining, knowledge and data engineering tools and techniques, semantic graphs.
Ç
1I NTRODUCTION
B
EINGable to automatically identify abnormal individuals
such as potential terrorists or criminals in large
amounts of relational data is an important knowledge
discovery task for homeland security and law enforcement
agencies. Intelligence analysts and crime investigators are
often overwhelmed by the large data volumes they are
faced with and need automated systems to help them
search through this data for potential suspects and other
relevant information. Although identifying such indivi-
duals is an important step, a useful system should also be
able to generate human-understandable explanations re-
vealing why a particular individual was chosen. For
example, an explanation such as “X is suspicious, because it
is the only Mafiya group in the data set that has a member who
ordered a contract murder”
1 might help an analyst assess the
relevance and validity of a particular result and guide
follow-up investigations into the data to further confirm or
deny the suspiciousness of an individual.
The kind of data we are focusing on throughout this
paper are semantic graphs, which have become an important
tool for analysts in the intelligence and law enforcement
community [1], [2], [3]. A semantic graph is a graph where
nodes represent objects of different types (for example,
persons, papers, organizations, etc.) and links represent
binary relationships between those objects (for example,
friend, citation, etc.). We focus on semantic graphs with
multiple different types of relations, which we call multi-
relational networks (MRNs). Having multiple relationship
types in the data is important, since those carry different
kinds of semantic information, which will allow us to
automatically compare and contrast entities connected by
them. MRNs are a powerful yet simple representation
mechanism to describe complex relationships and connec-
tions between individuals. For example, a bibliography
network such as the one shown in Fig. 1 is an MRN that
represents authors, papers, journals, organizations, etc., as
nodes and their various relationships such as authorship,
citation, affiliation, etc., as links. The Web is an MRN if we
distinguish, for example, incoming, outgoing, and e-mail
links. Data stored in relational databases or the ground facts
in a knowledge base can usually also be easily described via
MRNs (some transformations might be necessary, for
example, to map n-ary relations onto binary links—see
Section 2.1.1).
Why do we focus on finding abnormal instances in
MRNs? Our assumption is that in the general population,
criminal behavior is the exception, and it is reasonable to
infer that people who look typical (that is, they have many
similar peers) are not likely to be malicious. This is justified
if we assume the data to be investigated to contain
primarily innocent persons, whose behavior has a higher
chance to be similar to somebody else’s behavior in the
same data set. Furthermore, it is reasonable to assume that
malicious behaviors are often carried out by unusual
methods to avoid detection. For example, criminals might
try to disguise themselves by playing some pretend
business role but are likely to get things wrong, since they
are not real market actors. Such behavior is more likely to
create unusual evidence, and therefore, a node with an
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1. This is output generated automatically by our system when applied to
a synthetic data set in the domain of Russian organized crime.
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suspicious compared with one that has many similar peers.
Nevertheless, abnormality does not necessarily imply
suspiciousness and could be due to other factors such as
missing evidence, data entry errors, innocent unusual
behavior, etc.
If one accepts the claim that abnormality might be a good
indicator for criminal or malicious entities, the next
important question to ask is what kind of system is best
suited for identifying abnormal instances in semantic
graphs: a rule-based system [4], a supervised learning
system [3], or an unsupervised system? Rule-based systems
generally perform some type of pattern match based on
manually created rules to identify abnormal instances.
Supervised learning systems take a set of manually labeled
example individuals as inputs and then try to learn patterns
or other descriptions to classify new individuals. The
advantage of these approaches is that they can achieve
relatively high precision due to the manual crafting of rules
or selection of training examples. A severe disadvantage,
however, is that they are domain dependent, expensive to
create, and, most seriously, very sensitive to human bias. In
other words, the only abnormal instances such a system can
find are those that match the rules of a rule-based system or
those similar to the training examples of a supervised
system. However, malicious individuals constantly adapt
their behavior to avoid capture; therefore, for purposes such
as homeland security, we feel that it is important to have an
unsupervised system that can identify truly novel results
and avoid the biases described above. Another important
advantage of an unsupervised system is that it can be easily
adapted to a new domain, without having to produce a
completely new set of rules or training examples, which
could be very expensive and time consuming.
Traditional unsupervised network algorithms such as
PageRank, random walks, and social network analysis
(SNA) (for example, centrality and position analysis) have
been applied for homeland security and crime analysis with
a certain level of success [5], [6]; however, they all suffer a
serious drawback that the semantics of links are not
considered. That is, they are best suited for “single-
relational networks” where no link-type information is
available. For the MRNs focused on in this paper, we
describe a novel unsupervised method that does exploit the
additional information coming from the different types of
links, and our experiments show that our method outper-
forms the above algorithms by a significant margin.
A major concern with automated information awareness
systems is the generation of false positives where innocent
individuals are mistakenly identified as suspicious. As
pointed out in [7] and [8], false positives are a very serious
issue for any homeland security system, since even a system
with almost perfect 99 percent accuracy can result in the
mislabeling of millions of innocent individuals when
applied to a large population. Although an unsupervised
discovery system such as ours has the potential of being
able to identify additional abnormal individuals whose
characteristics were previously unknown (which improves
recall), it runs an even higher risk of increasing the number
of false positives, since there is no preexisting knowledge to
learn from.
Achieving 99 percent precision without completely
sacrificing recall is already an extremely difficult goal for
any automated data analysis system, yet it would still not
solve the false-positive problem. For this reason, we
p r o p o s ea ni n d i r e c ts o l u t i o nt oa d d r e s st h ei s s u eo f
verification, which we call explanation-based discovery.A n
explanation-based discovery system like ours can not only
identify suspicious persons but also generate human-
understandable explanations (for example, in natural
language) to show the analyst why they were chosen by
the system. This allows the analyst to better judge the
validity of the results and also provides a direction for
further investigation. For example, an explanation such as
“this person is suspicious, because he has never left his
house for the last five years” might suggest that he is not
likely to be a person to pay attention to in terms of hijacking
a plane. On the other hand, depending on the context, such
an explanation might prompt additional investigation to
find out why he has not left the home (maybe he was
bedridden or trying to hide).
Although we focus on false positives here, false
negatives are of course a very important problem as well,
and any automated system or human analyst will always
have to trade off the cost of a false negative (for example,
missing a planned attack) with the cost of too many false
positives such as incriminating innocent individuals or
overlooking something due to being overwhelmed with too
many useless hits.
The main contributions of this paper are the following:
First, we provide an unsupervised framework to model the
semantics of nodes in large complex semantic graphs into
what we call semantic profiles. Second, we propose to detect
potentially suspicious nodes as those with abnormal
semantic profiles, and our experiments show that our
method significantly outperforms other unsupervised net-
work algorithms that use heuristics such as node centrality,
importance, or cluster-based outliers. Third, we describe a
novel explanation mechanism that facilitates verification of
the discovered results by generating human-understand-
able natural language explanations describing the unique
aspects of these nodes. The human study we conducted
shows that the human subjects using these explanations
were able to solve a complex data analysis task much faster
and with much higher accuracy and confidence than
without them.
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Fig. 1. A MRN for a bibliography domain. The capital letter of each node
represents its type: A(author), P(paper), O(organization), and J(journal).
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GRAPHS
The general idea is that a node is abnormal and suspicious if
it carries abnormal or unique semantics in the network. To
realize this concept in an automated system, we generate a
semantic profile for each node by summarizing the graph
structure surrounding it based on the different types of
links and nodes connected to the node within a certain
distance. We then identify abnormal nodes as those that
possess abnormal semantic profiles.
Our observation is that the “semantics” of a semantic
graph is primarily carried by the structure of labeled links and
nodes in the network. Therefore, our system needs to utilize
this structure, as well as the label information, to model the
semantics of nodes in a way that is easy to compare and
contrast. To realize this idea, in our framework, a node is
modeled by a summarization of its surrounding labeled
network structure based on sequences of labels (that is,
paths), together with some statistical dependency measures,
between these paths and the node.
We decompose the whole process into two stages. The
first stage is structure modeling or feature selection. In this
stage, the system automatically selects a set of features to
represent the surrounding network structure of nodes. The
second stage is a dependency computation or feature value
generation stage. For this stage, we design a set of different
models to compute the dependency between the features
and the nodes in the MRN. A semantic profile of a node is
then constructed as a standard feature vector based on the
automatically selected features and the computed depen-
dency values.
2.1 Feature Selection Stage
To explain the feature selection stage, we start with a
motivating example derived from the bibliography network
shown in Fig. 1. Let us assume that our goal is to find out
which author among A1, A2, and A3 is the most abnormal
(that is, plays different roles compared with others). After
examining these nodes based on their connections to others,
we can conclude several things about each of them:
. A1 published two journal papers (P1 and P3), and
one of them cites the other. A1 belongs to organiza-
tion O1, has a colleague A3, and coauthored one
paper with A4.
. A2 published two journal papers (P4 and P5), and
one of them cites the other. A2 belongs to organiza-
tion O2, has a colleague A3, and coauthored one
paper with A4.
. A3 published one paper P2 (no citation). A3 belongs
to two organizations O1 and O2, and has two
colleagues A1 and A2.
Based on the above description, it is not very hard to
recognize that A3 has the most abnormal semantics,
because its behavior, as captured by the network, is very
different from the other two. The example shows that it is
possible for humans to successfully identify abnormal
nodes in such a network if we can somehow summarize
their roles or the surrounding structure. However, since our
ultimate goal is to design an automatic mechanism to
perform this comparison, we need a systematic method to
model the semantics or roles of the nodes to make them
comparable and contrastable.
To illustrate this idea, we start by systematically listing
the two-step paths starting from a node with their
corresponding natural language interpretation. For exam-
ple, below is the interpretation for A1:
. Path 1: A1—writes—P1—publishedIn—J1 (A1
writes P1, which is published in J1)
. Path 2: A1—writes—P3—publishedIn—J1 (A1
writes P3, which is published in J1)
. Path 3: A1—writes—P1—cites 1—P3 (A1 writes P1,
which is cited by P3; note that relation 1 stands for
the inverse of relation)
. Path 4: A1—writes—P3—cites—P1 (A1 writes P3,
which cites P1)
. Path 5: A1—writes—P3—writes 1—A4 (A1 writes
P3, which is written by A4)
. Path 6: A1—belongs—O1—belongs 1—A3 (A1 be-
longs to O1, which is the organization of A3)
By combining and condensing the information provided
by those paths, one can come up with descriptions of nodes
similar to the ones we have provided previously. For
example, in the case of A1, Paths 1 and 2 tell us that A1
wrote two journal papers. The next two paths tell us that
one paper cites the other. Path 5 reveals that A1 coauthored
with A4, whereas the last path shows that A1 belongs to
organization O1 and has a colleague.
This observation motivates a key idea of our approach for
using these paths to capture the semantics of nodes. Another
justification is that each path in a network can be translated
into a standard logical notation by representing nodes as
constants and links via binary predicates. Those predicates
contain meanings and can be translated into the natural
language, as we did for the above paths. For example, in
Fig. 1, the path A1—writes—P3—cites—P1 can be repre-
sented as the conjunction writesðA1;P3Þ^citesðP3;P1Þ.
This logical expression partly characterizes the meaning of
the nodes A1, P1, and P3. It only partially characterizes their
meaning, since there are many other paths (or logical
expressions) that also involve these nodes. In our view, it
is the combination of all paths a node participates in that
determines its semantics. This differs from standard denota-
tional semanticsin which a node’s interpretation is the object
it denotes and is more closely related to the formal semantics
for semantic networks where the meaning of a node is
determined by the whole network [9].
Given these observations, one naive approach to capture
a semantic profile of a node is by treating all paths in the
network as binary features, assigning true to the paths the
given node participates in and false to the ones it does not.
By doing this, we have essentially transformed a semantic
graph into a propositional representation, where each node
is a point in a high-dimensional space with attributes
identifying its semantics based on its role in the network.
Although this describes the basic idea for representing
the semantic profiles of nodes, there are still some problems
that we must address. The first is that treating each path as
a different feature generates an overfitting problem. Since
each path is unique, the only nodes sharing a particular
path feature would be those participating in the path, which
would make these profiles useless for comparing nodes
inside the path with the ones outside of it. A second
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semantic graph can easily contain millions of paths, and
computation in such a high-dimensional space would be
difficult and costly.
These issues motivate the search for a more condensed
featuresetthatstillcanadequatelycapturetherolesemantics
of instances. We do this by defining equivalence classes
between different paths that we call path types and then use
these path types instead of individual paths as features.
Whether two individual paths are considered to be of the
same type will depend on one of several similarity measures
(which we call metaconstraints) we can choose. For example,
we can view a set of paths as equivalent (or similar or of the
same type) if they use the same order of relations. This view
would consider the following two paths as equivalent:
citesðP2;P1Þ^publishedInðP1;J1Þ;
citesðP2;P3Þ^publishedInðP3;J1Þ:
Given these generalization strategies, the next question
becomes how we can generate a meaningful representa-
tive set of path types? One way is to apply a variable
relaxation approach. Taking the path citesðP2;P1Þ^
publishedInðP1;J1Þ as an example, we find there are five
ground elements in this path: cites, P1, P2, publishedIn,
and J1. If we relax one of its elements, say, J1,t oa
variable ?X, then we get a new relaxed path type
citesðP2;P1Þ^publishedInðP1;?XÞ, which now represents
a more general concept: “paper P2 cites paper P1 that is
published in some journal.” Relaxing further, we could
also generalize a link such as publishedIn, which would
give us citesðP2;P1Þ^?Y ðP1;?XÞ or “paper P2 cites
paper P1 that has something to do with something.” In
fact, we can generalize any combination of nodes or links
in a path to arrive at a more general path type. These
path types still convey meaning but do so at a more
abstract level. This makes them more useful as features to
compare and contrast different instances or nodes. In
Section 2.3, we will discuss a small set of metaconstraints
that allows our system to generate path-type features
fully automatically.
2.1.1 Formal Definitions and Notation
Let us define these concepts more precisely:
Definition 1. An MRN MðV;E;L Þ is a directed labeled graph,
where V is a finite set of nodes, L is a finite set of labels, and
E   V   L   V is a finite set of edges. Given a triple
representing an edge, the functions source, label, and target
map it onto its start vertex, label, and end vertex, respectively.
The function typesðVÞ!f f t1;...;t kg;t i 2 L;k   1g maps
each vertex onto its set of type labels.
Note that edges are restricted to be binary, but any n-ary
relation can be represented by introducing an additional
element reifying the relationship and n binary edges to
represent each argument. In fact, the data sets described in
Section 4 represent various n-ary relationships such as a
murder event that has a perpetrator, a victim, and a location
as a set of binary edges associated with an event object.
Definition 2. Let MðV;E;LÞ be an MRN. The inverse edge
set E 1 is the set of all edges ðv1;l  1;v 2Þ such that
ðv2;l;v 1Þ2E.
When analyzing an MRN, we will usually consider both
its forward and inverse edge sets. Note that this is not the
same as treating it as an undirected graph, since forward
and inverse edges will participate in different path types.
Definition 3. Let MðV;E;L Þ be an MRN. A path p in M is a
sequence of edges ðe1;e 2;...;e nÞ, n   1, such that each ei 2 E
and targetðeiÞ¼sourceðeiþ1Þ.
Definition 4. Let MðV;E;L Þ be an MRN and P be a set of
paths in M. A set of path types PTðPÞ is a disjoint partition
fpt1;pt 2;...;pt kg, k   1,o fP such that each pti is a set of
paths fpi1;...;p img, pij 2 P, that are considered to be
equivalent (that is, each pti is an equivalence class).
Definition 5. Let MðV;E;L Þ be an MRN and P be a set of
paths in M. A metaconstraint mc is any function mcðPÞ!
P0 such that P0   P.
Definition 6. Let MðV;E;LÞ be an MRN, P be a set of
paths in M, and mc be a metaconstraint. Then, the set of
path types PTmcðPÞ defined by mc is the disjoint
partition fpt1;pt 2;...;pt kg, k   1,o fP such that for each
pti ¼f pi1;...;p img, pij 2 P, mcðpi1Þ¼...¼ mcðpimÞ, and
there is no path p 2 P   pti such that mcðpÞ¼mcðpi1Þ.
That is, a metaconstraint can be viewed as mapping each
path onto its representative in a path-type equivalence class.
2.2 Feature Value Computation
A major advantage of using path types is that we do not
limit ourselves to only binary features (that is, whether a
node does or does not participate in a path). Instead, we can
apply statistical methods to determine the dependence
between a path type and a node and use it as the
corresponding feature value.
2.2.1 Performing Random Experiments on a
Multirelational Network
Measures such as conditional probability and mutual
information (MI) are commonly used to compute statistical
dependence. These measures rely on the existence of
nondeterministic dependency between random variables.
However, a normal MRN, unlike a Bayesian network or a
general belief network, is a deterministic graph structure
instead of a probabilistic one. It represents the relationships
between nodes, and normally, there are no probabilities
associated with these nodes and links. As a result, questions
such as “what is the MI between a node x and a path
type pt” are ill defined, because not only is there no
uncertainty associated with x and pt, but they are also not
random variables.
To apply statistical dependency measures to a determi-
nistic MRN in order to compute the correlation between
nodes and path types, we introduce a set of random
experiments carried out on the MRN. Based on the results
of these experiments, we can create certain random
variables and use them to measure the dependency between
a node and a path type. To elaborate this idea, we introduce
two random experiments to select a path in an MRN:
. Random Experiment 1 (RE1). Randomly pick a path
from the MRN. In this case, the chance of each path
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number of paths in the MRN.
. Random Experiment 2 (RE2). First randomly pick a
node in the MRN and then randomly pick a path
that starts from the selected node.
Any of these random experiments produces a single path
as the output. However, the probability of each path to be
selected varies, depending on the selection policy. Based on
the single-path output of an experiment, we can then
introduce two random variables S and PT:
. S: The starting node of this selected path.
. PT: The path type of this selected path.
Note that both S and PT are discrete random variables,
where the number of possible realizations of S equals the
total number of nodes in the MRN, and that of PT equals
the total number of path types. Given these random
variables, we can now compute the dependencies between
nodes and path types in a variety of ways, described below.
2.2.2 Measuring Node/Path Dependence via
Contribution
We start by an observation that each path type contains
multiple realizations in the data set. Take the path type
writesð?X;?YÞ as an example: an instance A1 might occur
in many paths of this type (say,
writesðA1;P1Þ;...;writesðA1;P99Þ;
representing that A1 wrote 99 papers), whereas another
instance A2 might occur only in a few (say, one time).
Assuming that in the whole data set, only A1 and A2 write
papers, we can say that A1 contributes 99 percent, A2
contributes 1 percent, and the rest contributes 0 percent to
this “writing a paper” path type. That is, if a path is selected
randomly, then the conditional probability is 99 percent for
the event “given the path is of type writes, then the starting
node is A1”o rpRE1ðS ¼ A1jPT ¼ writesÞ. In this case, we
can say that the dependency measure between the node A1
and path type writes is 0.99.
Definition 7. Let s be a node and pt be a path type. Then, the
contributionk relative to the Random Experiment k of node s
to path type pt is the conditional probability between the two
random variables S and PT:
contributionkðs;ptÞ¼pkðS ¼ sjPT ¼ ptÞ:
The contribution value therefore encodes the depen-
dency information between a node and a path type. The
concept is intuitive and understandable, since it basically
encodes the relative frequency with which a particular path
type is associated with a node. This is a very useful and
important characteristic for generating human-understand-
able explanations, which will be described later. Besides the
contribution measure, we also designed additional mea-
sures to compute node-path dependency based on MI and
pointwise MI (PMI). These measures and experiments
evaluating them are described in [10]. Finally, given these
path-type features and their contributions with respect to
nodes as feature values, we can construct the semantic
profiles of nodes.
2.3 Metaconstraints
As described above, path types can be generated from paths
by a method called variable relaxation. Given that every
element in a path can be relaxed to a variable, how can the
system systematically select a set of path types? In this
section, we describe several metaconstraints that control
how the system determines path types automatically from
the given data. Moreover, these high-level constraints also
provide users a means to introduce their biases or domain
knowledge if necessary. There are essentially two types of
constraints: 1) path equivalence constraints that determine
when two paths are considered to be equivalent or of the
same path type and 2) filter constraints that restrict the set
of paths considered in feature selection, for example, path-
length constraints and link-type constraints would fall into
this category.
Metaconstraint 1 (relation-only constraint). This is a
path equivalence constraint that tells the system to treat
paths with the same sequence of relations (links) as of the
same path type. In other words, it considers only link types
and ignores any information provided by the nodes in a
path. This is the default constraint used by our system to
create semantic profiles, since in general, we assume that the
typed links play a more important role and can convey more
information than the names or types of nodes in a path.
Metaconstraint 2 (maximum path length). This is a filter
constraint used by the system to limit the path length while
selecting path types as features. Constraining the path
length is important for a variety of reasons: for one, the
farther away a node or link is from the source node, the less
impact it has on the source node’s semantics. Moreover, the
longer a path is, the harder it is for humans to make sense of
it. Path length is also an important performance determiner,
given that considering longer and longer paths can lead to
an explosion in path instances and path-type features. By
default, our system uses a maximum path length of five,
which has worked well on the various data sets we have
analyzed so far.
Based on Metaconstraints 1 and 2, the system can fully
automatically extract a set of path types from an MRN to
represent the semantics of the nodes. Note that if the
maximum path length chosen is k, all path types of length 1
to k that occur in the data will be selected as features.
Metaconstraint 3 (node- and link-type constraints).
These are filter constraints that allow users to express their
preference in terms of the types of nodes and links that
should be considered (instead of considering all link types,
which is done by default). For example, one could specify
that at least one of the nodes in a path needs to be of type
person or that one of the links needs to be a murder link.
3A BNORMAL NODE DISCOVERY WITH UNICORN
We can now describe how our node discovery program
UNICORN identifies abnormal nodes in an MRN or
semantic graph.
2 The information flow is shown in the
upper part of Fig. 2. First, we compute the set of path types
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important to note that users can choose either to incorporate
their domain knowledge through metaconstraints or use the
default relation-only constraint in this stage. In the default
configuration, no user input is required to determine the set
of path-type features from the given MRN. Once the set of
path types is determined, UNICORN computes the depen-
dency (that is, either contribution or PMI values based on
one of the random experiments) as the feature values to
generate a semantic profile for each node. Finally, UNI-
CORN applies an outlier ranking algorithm to find nodes
with abnormal semantic profiles. The following pseudocode
describes this more formally:
An important aspect of UNICORN is that it is designed
as a framework with a variety of options at each stage that
users can choose from. In the feature selection stage,
metaconstraints provide users a certain amount of flex-
ibility to introduce their preferences, without affecting the
overall advantage of being domain independent. In the
feature value generation stage, users can choose from two
different random experiments (RE1 as default), as well as
from several dependency models such as contribution (the
default), MI, and PMI measures, each of which has a
slightly different view and intuition for node/path depen-
dency. In the final stage, users can apply different types of
outlier ranking algorithms to find different types of
abnormal instances. By default, UNICORN uses Ramaswa-
my’s distance-based outlier algorithm, which finds outliers
based on the largest kth neighbor distance [11].
The lower part of Fig. 2 describes the subsystem that
produces the explanations for UNICORN’s results, which
will be elaborated in more detail in Section 5.
4E VALUATION OF UNICORN
In its default configuration, UNICORN returns a list of
nodes ranked in descending order by their kth neighbor
distance, that is, nodes with the largest distance to their
kth neighbor are listed at the top. What we want to evaluate
here is some notion of quality of the rankings UNICORN
generates. Unfortunately, there is no gold standard avail-
able to us describing what it means for an instance to be
truly abnormal, nor do we have labeled test data describing
such instances that makes evaluation a somewhat challen-
ging problem (cf., [12]).
UNICORN finds anomalous instances based on their
semantic profiles and the chosen outlier computation. The
evaluation question we are trying to answer below is
whether for some relevant data sets of interest, the
abnormality scores UNICORN computes correspond with
some real-world notion of suspiciousness, interestingness,
or, most generally, usefulness.
We address this question by applying UNICORN to a set
of third-party-generated synthetic data sets in the domain of
Russian organized crime. The primary reason for using
synthetic data is that it comes with an answer key and
ground truth describing entities of interest such as perpe-
trators that need to be found, which allows us to measure the
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natural data such as the movie data set described in
Section 6. Other reasons are that real data from the area of
law enforcement or intelligence analysisis generally difficult
to come by due to access restrictions and privacy concerns.
After applying UNICORN to these data sets, we compare its
performance with a selection of other state-of-the-art
unsupervised network algorithms that have been used for
problems in law enforcement and counterterrorism.
The data sets are part of a large suite of simulated data
sets developed during the US Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency (DARPA)’s Evidence Extraction and Link
Discovery Program for the purpose of evaluating link
discovery algorithms such as pattern matchers, group
detectors, etc., (see [13] for additional context). The data
was generated by a simulator of a Russian organized crime
(or Mafiya with a “y”) domain that simulates the whole
process of ordering, planning, and executing high-level
criminal activities such as murders for hire or gang wars
with a large number of possible variations and records an
incomplete and noisy picture of these activities in the
generated evidence files (for example, financial transac-
tions, phone calls or email, somebody being observed at a
location, somebody being killed by someone unknown,
etc.). The hierarchy of event types is shown in Fig. 3. The
highest level events, gang wars and industry takeovers,
both involve lower level events such as contract murders,
which in turn involve some planning, financing, execution,
etc. Gang wars occur between two rivaling Mafiyas, and
industry takeovers are attempts by one Mafiya to take over
an industry controlled by another. The general task for an
algorithm is to detect these high-level activities (not
reported in the data) from the low-level incomplete noisy
evidence. For evaluation, the details of these activities and
their participants are described in an answer key.
Despite the obvious simplification over real organized
crime activity, the generated data is quite large and
complex. We tested on six different data sets (D1 to D6)
whose characteristics are described in Tables 1 and 2. Each
data set contains roughly 6,000-9,000 nodes, whereas the
number of links ranges from 8,000 to 16,000. There are
16 different node types representing objects and events and
31 different link types representing the relationships
between those nodes. Each data set contains 42 Mafiya
groups and 21 different industries. The data sets differ in
size (large or medium), observability (low, average, or
high), and noise level (0, 1, or 2). The size parameter does
not reflect the total number of nodes and links in the data
but instead how many contract murder events there are.
Large-sized data sets contain 20 contract murder events and
both a gang war and industry takeover, whereas medium-
sized ones only have 10 contract murder events and only an
industry takeover. Observability stands for the amount of
evidence that is actually revealed. In other words, the lower
the observability is, the less evidence of events is reported
in the data. The noise parameter represents the degree of
noise in level-2 events, with approximately 2,000 noise
events for level-2, 1,000 noise events for level-1, and no
noise event for level-0 data sets. Given these settings, D1 is
the most difficult data set (large size, low observability, and
high noise), whereas D6 is the least difficult.
We used this data to perform the following experiment:
for each data set, we feed the evidence data graph to
UNICORN and ask it to rank the 42 Mafiyas based on their
abnormality (using their semantic profiles and Ramaswa-
my’s distance-based outlier algorithm). We then check how
well the top-ranked Mafiyas correspond to the Mafiyas of
interest reported in the answer key (three for large-sized
and one for medium-sized data). We compare UNICORN’s
performance with that of a set of unsupervised network
algorithms that fall into two classes: 1) The first class is
composed of centrality-based ranking algorithms such as
PageRank [14], Hypertext Induced Topic Selection (HITS)
[15], and Betweenness Centrality [16], which all compute
some form of importance or authority score based on the
connectivity of a node in a graph. PageRank and Between-
ness were chosen, specifically, since they have been applied
previously to analyze terrorist networks [5], [6]. 2) The
second class of algorithms is outlier based, which is similar
to UNICORN, such as an outlier detector based on Markov
graph clustering [17] and an unlabeled length-only variant
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TABLE 1
Properties of the Simulated Russian Organized Crime Data
TABLE 2
Node and Link Types
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lengths of paths. All of the comparison algorithms work on
unlabeled graphs only, so any edge label information is
removed before the algorithm is applied (to the best of our
knowledge, there are no other algorithms of this kind
available that do use edge label information). Note that the
data sets were not expressly designed to test anomaly
detectors, so it is not clear a priori whether anomalous
Mafiyas will or should match the ones reported in the
answer key.
Results are shown in Table 3. For each algorithm, we
show how it ranks the two gang war Mafiyas GM1 and
GM2 and/or the industry takeover Mafiya ITM described in
the answer key of each data set. A perfect algorithm would
rank the target Mafiyas at positions 1–3 for data sets D1–D3
and at position 1 for data sets D4–D6. The “Perfect” score
for each algorithm lists how many Mafiyas were ranked
perfectly (that is, there is no “innocent” Mafiya ranked
higher than it) for each data set. We also average and
normalize these scores to show what overall percentage of
Mafiyas was ranked in perfect position. To evaluate the
quality of nonperfect rankings, we compute a position error
that measures on the average how many innocent candi-
dates are ranked higher than the target ones. The rationale
for this is that an investigator or analyst following the
generated ranking would have to investigate all these false
positives before the particular target Mafiya was reached
and, presumably, identified as a hit. We compute a
normalized maximum error “max Err” based on the worst
of the rankings. For example, for Betweenness on data set
D3 the worst ranking is 12 (for the industry takeover
Mafiya); therefore, the error would be computed as
ð12   3Þ=39   100 percent ¼ 23:1 percent. The average posi-
tion error “avg Err” averages these errors over all target
Mafiyas (for medium-sized data sets D4–D6, the maximum
and average errors are the same).
Algorithms are listedinorderofperformance. UNICORN
using its default relation-only constraint to automatically
generate path-type features and a maximum path length of
five scores best overall with 83.3 percent of perfect rankings
and an average position error of less than 1 percent. Its
closest competitor HITS has an average error that is six times
larger. The difference is even more significant on the most
difficult data set D1. The unlabeled version of UNICORN
that was run in an identical setup but computing path-type
contributions based on path length only and ignoring all
edge label information comes in third. This shows that for
this data, a significant portion of the relevant information
does come from basic path frequencies and connectivity, but
adding label information can very significantly improve the
accuracy of the generated rankings.
MCO stands for “Markov Clustering-based Outlier
Detection” and uses the MCL graph clustering package
[17] to find outliers in the evidence graph. Clustering
finds outliers not directly but as a side effect, and we had
to use MCL in the following way to generate a ranked list
of outliers: By sweeping MCL’s inflation parameter from
low to high, we generated clusterings with finer and finer
granularity containing more and more single-element
clusters (outliers). We stop once all 42 Mafiyas are
reported in an outlier cluster and use the inflation
parameter value at which a Mafiya became an outlier as
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Performance Results for Various Algorithms on the Simulated Russian Organized Crime Data Sets
For each algorithm, the ranking of the target Mafiyas GM1, GM2, and/or ITM are shown (ideal rankings in bold italics), as well as the number of
perfect rankings and the maximum and average positional ranking errors (which are the same for D4-D6).
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with the lowest inflation value and most coarse-grained
clustering). Given the strong performance of outlier
detectors such as UNICORN, it was somewhat surprising
that MCO performed very badly and that its rankings
were in fact negatively correlated with the desired target
Mafiyas. Upon further analysis, it turned out that MCO’s
top-ranked Mafiyas had generally a higher node degree
(an average 9.9 for its top five) than its bottom-ranked
results (an average 6.6 for its bottom five), whereas the
average node degree for Mafiyas was 7.8 with an average
maximum of 12 and a minimum of 4.3. Moreover, the
average node degree of the target Mafiyas to be found
was also 7.8 ð  ¼ 1:9Þ. Therefore, on average, there was
nothing special about their node degree, whereas MCO
preferred those with higher degrees. One possible ex-
planation for this behavior is that when we ask MCO to
generate finer and finer clusters, nodes with a high
degree present a problem, since they are connected to
many other nodes that would generally increase cluster
size; therefore, marking them as single-element outliers
can increase the global quality score of the resulting
clusters.
For this reason, we added a “Reverse MCO” pseudoal-
gorithm for comparison that simply reverses the list
generated by MCO, which in turn performs quite well.
PageRank also generated rankings that were negatively
correlated, and we added a “Reverse PageRank,” which
was a much better predictor of the desired target Mafiyas.
Both of these results indicate that for this data, high
connectivity or a hub score can be a bad predictor for the
target nodes sought.
In summary, some centrality and authority scorers such
as HITS and Betweenness, as well as some outlier detectors
such as UNICORN and Unlabeled UNICORN, picked up
the desired target Mafiyas with good to reasonable
accuracy. However, UNICORN, which is anomaly based
and the only algorithm that took edge labels into account,
consistently outperformed or matched all other algorithms
on all data sets with an average error that is six times
smaller than its closest competitor and 83.3 percent of all
Mafiyas being ranked in perfect position. Performance
differences were most significant on the hardest data set D1.
Note that the average maximum error for each data set is a
good match for our predicted data set difficulty based on
the parameters reported in Table 1, with D1 being the most
difficult and D6 being the easiest data set.
We believe the major reason that UNICORN outper-
formed the other algorithms by a significant margin is
twofold: First, it has the capability to utilize the information
provided by different types of links, whereas the other
algorithms do not take different semantics of links into
account. Second, using abnormality as a heuristic for
finding suspicious instances seems to be a better option
than using the centrality or importance of nodes.
We also performed experiments to rank the 21 industries
in each data set with very similar results, which are
reported in detail in [10]. Additionally, we evaluated the
performance on the local node discovery problem where we
try to identify nodes that are abnormally connected to a
given source such as one of the gang war Mafiyas or the
industry in an industry takeover. Results show (see [10])
that this task is significantly easier and that for most of the
data sets except the hardest ones (that is, data sets D1, D4,
and D5 with low observability and high noise), all
algorithms can successfully identify the crime participants.
One reason why all algorithms perform significantly
better here is that by providing a high-quality source node,
we provide a seed suspect, which has a much higher chance
to have strong connections to other suspects than an
average node. Therefore, finding important or strong
connections to a seed suspect is likely to turn up other
suspects (“guilt by association”), which is a phenomenon
also exploited by some group detection algorithms [18]. The
result reveals an interesting phenomenon where suspects
have both important and abnormal connection with other
suspects, since they can be detected with both types of
mechanisms. However, again, except for the two hardest
data sets D1 and D4 with low observability and high noise,
our algorithm outperforms the others by a significant
margin.
We also evaluated how UNICORN performs with
different choices of maximum path length (see [10]). The
results show that path length correlates positively with
performance on the crime data sets. As reported in Table 3,
for k ¼ 5, the results are close to perfect. The results suggest
that it is useful to consider information provided by nodes
and links that are multiple steps away from the source node
in our framework. Note that the improvement decreases
gradually with increasing path length (33 percent from k ¼
1 to k ¼ 2, but only 11 percent from k ¼ 4 to k ¼ 5). The
deterioration of the improvement shows that the quality of
information does not improve linearly with the increasing
number of features, which implies a reasonable hypothesis
that the farther away a node or link is from the source, the
less impact it has on it.
5G ENERATING EXPLANATIONS FOR ABNORMAL
NODES
The idea of our explanation-based discovery system is to
summarize why abnormal nodes are different from the rest
in some human-understandable form such as natural
language. The goal is to provide users information to assist
them in judging whether the reported instances are really
suspicious or not. For example, in the experiment described
above, our system reported the Mafiya groups it found to be
most abnormal. Since this was a synthetic data set with an
answer key, we could look at that to see whether the results
it came up with made sense. In a real-world situation, no
answer key is available, and conceivably, more information
is required to convince an analyst or investigator of the
validity and relevance of a result.
5.1 Explaining the Uniqueness of Nodes
This section describes a novel mechanism to generate
explanations for the abnormal nodes discovered by our
system. Recall that we find such nodes by looking for those
that possess abnormal semantic profiles derived from the
semantic graph. Technically, this is done by first generating
a set of features (path types), together with their feature
values (contributions) for each node, and then applying a
distance-based outlier algorithm to extract abnormal nodes.
The process of generating explanations can be viewed as a
kind of summarization process that identifies a small
amount of key features that cause a node to be unique
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standable form.
To explain an abnormal point, the explanation system
first needs to select a subset of features that contribute the
most to its uniqueness. That is, it has to determine a subset
of features whose feature values in combination are
sufficient to distinguish the abnormal node from other
points. In addition, it has to analyze how such an outlier
performs in terms of these features to separate it from the
rest, and then, it has to produce a human-understandable
explanation based on that.
To select a small set of dominant features, we treat an
explanation as a process of classification, where describing
the differences between instances is accomplished by
finding a method to classify different types of points into
different classes and then characterizing these classes to a
human. This idea is implemented by assigning a special
class label to the outlier (labeled O in Fig. 2) and then
applying a human-understandable classifier such as a
decision tree to separate the outlier class from the rest
(the normal class labeled N in Fig. 2). The process of the
decision tree classifier can then be rendered into a human-
understandable explanation. All explanations shown in this
paper use this two-class N=Oexplanation scheme; however,
in [10], we also developed a three-class scheme that uses an
additional reference class R.
We designed two different strategies for explanation.
The first uses a normal continuous decision tree that
employs the information gain heuristic for feature selection.
It produces a set of decision rules describing the uniqueness
of a node, which can be rendered into explanations such as
the following example from the organized crime data set:
uid667 is the only 1 Mafiya that has
. larger than 20.8 percent contribution for [hasMember,
ceo] (eliminates 40 nodes) and
. smaller than 11.1 percent contribution for [hasMember,
sender] (eliminates 1 node).
This example tells us that uid667 is the only Mafiya that
has a more than 20.8 percent chance to be the starting node
S of a path of type “S has some member who is the CEO of
some company” and a smaller than 11.1 percent chance to
start a path of type “S has some member who is the sender
of some communication event.”
The second strategy is to give higher priority to the
decision boundary at zero, which we call zero/nonzero
separation. For the same example node, we now get this
explanation:
uid667 is the only 1 Mafiya that has
. nonzero [hasMember, hitContractor] (eliminates
38 nodes),
. zero [operatesInRegion] (eliminates 2 nodes), and
. zero [hasMember, victim] (eliminates 1 node).
The above decision rules tell us that uid667 is the only
Mafiya that has some member who ordered a murder (that
is, contracted a hit), does not operate in some region, and
does not have a member who is a victim in some event.
The final step of explanation generation is to translate the
path-based network representation into natural language.
For example, we want to translate the following path:
John  !
emails
?P  !
fatherOf
?Q  !
travelsTo
USA
into “John sends an email to somebody whose child travels
to USA.” Due to the space limitation, we do not present the
technical details of the natural language generation system,
which have been described in [19].
Here is another example of a zero/nonzero explanation
for an abnormal movie person generated by our system
from the KDD Movie data set described in Section 6:
Salvador Dali is the only one actor in the data set (which
contains 10,917 candidates) that
. is the visual director of some movie,
. is the writer of some movie, and
. never is the sibling of some movie person.
5.2 Evaluating the Explanation System
In this section, we describe an evaluation of the usefulness
of our explanation system based on the synthetic organized
crime data set. The goal is twofold: first, we want to know
whether the explanations generated by our system can
assist human subjects to make more accurate and confident
decisions in terms of identifying the crime participants, and
second, we want to know whether they can reduce the time
needed to make these identifications. To answer these
questions, we designed three tasks: In Task 1, we provided
subjects the original D1 data set as a file (see Table 1) with
English translations for each relation. We then asked them
to select three Mafiyas from 10 given candidates that are
most likely to have participated in the gang wars (GM1 and
GM2) and industry takeover (ITM). In Task 2, we provided
the zero/nonzero explanations for those 10 candidates and
asked the subjects to perform the same task based only on
the provided explanations. We recorded the time (the
maximum time allowed was 60 minutes) and confidence
(from 0 to 4, 0 means no confidence at all) for each task. To
avoid interference and bias among different tasks, we
changed the names of the candidates for each task and also
told the users that they are from different data sets. We
tested on 10 human subjects. The results are described in
Table 4.
For Task 1, for each Mafiya group sought, only one
human subject did successfully identify it within the time
limit. Six of the 10 subjects gave up after spending less than
60 minutes on it for the reason that they believed the data to
be too complicated for them to analyze. This is under-
standable given the thousands of nodes and links that
subjects have to keep track of as the system does. Our
human subjects’ feedbacks indicate that reasoning with
higher degree paths is very hard for humans, in particular,
compared with the machine, which only took less than
1 minute to generate the semantic profiles for the Mafiyas
and produce the explanations. Note that the times recorded
here are the average time for the subjects who reported at
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Evaluation Results for the Explanation System
For each task, the percentage of subjects that correctly identified the
target Mafiyas ITM, GM1, and GM2 is shown, as well as their average
confidence and time to solve the task.
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is close to 0 (0.3). This demonstrates that the original
network with baseline explanation (that is, simply translat-
ing every single relation into English) is very difficult for
humans to analyze within a limited amount of time. The
results for Task 2 show that armed with zero/nonzero
explanations, subjects do much better and have a very high
chance (90 percent) to identify the abnormal candidates
within much less time spent (22.5 minutes) and much
higher confidence (2.2).
6A PPLICATION TO TWO REAL-WORLD DATA SETS
Below, we demonstrate how UNICORN can find abnormal
nodes in real-world natural data sets. Our goal is to show
how the complete system works, as well as that it is
domain independent and can be applied to find abnormal
or interesting instances in arbitrary semantic graphs. For
this purpose, we applied UNICORN to Gio Wiederhold’s
KDD Movie data set,
3 and to the HEP-Th High Energy
Physics Theory (HEP-Th) bibliography data set from the
2003 KDD Cup.
4
In the first network generated from the movie data, there
are about 24,000 nodes representing movies (9,097),
directors (3,233), actors (10,917), and some other movie-
related persons (500) (the numbers in parentheses show the
number of different nodes for each entity type). We
extracted about 100,000 relations between these nodes.
There are 44 different relation types in this data set, which
can be divided into three groups: relations between people
(for example, spouse and mentor), relations between
movies (for example, remake), and relations between a
person and a movie (for example, director and actor). To
make the explanations more understandable, we chose to
use at most three features to explain nodes and limit the
maximum path length to four.
Table 5 illustrates UNICORN’s two different explanation
types to explain the uniqueness of Hitchcock when viewed
as an actor. According to our system, he is one of the most
abnormal actors in the movie data set, which is not
surprising, given the data set’s bias for Hitchcock movies
and his much more prominent role as a director. In (A),
zero/nonzero separation is used, and the system extracts
two features (that is, nonzero contributions of two path
types) to separate him from the rest of the world. In (B), the
standard information gain heuristic is used, which unveils
important information for the uniqueness of Hitchcock by
showing that he directed more movies than any other actor
in the data set.
For the second network, we extracted six different types
of nodes and six types of links (plus their six inverses) from
the HEP-Th bibliography data. Nodes represent paper IDs
(29,014), author names (12,755), journal names (267),
organization names (963), keywords (40), and publication
times encoded as year/season pairs (60). Most of these node
types and their associated link types are illustrated in Fig. 1.
There were 43,099 different nodes and 477,423 links overall.
Table 6 shows two explanations for an abnormal author
in the HEP-Th data. As can be seen from (A), using zero/
nonzero separation with three features is not sufficient to
distinguish C.N. Pope from the rest of the authors, since
there are still 1,145 other authors with the same character-
istics. However, in (B), we can see that by using the
standard information-gain heuristic, his abnormality can be
explained with a single feature, which is that he has the
highest chance of citing his own paper. One reason for this
different explanation characteristic is that the HEP-Th
network has more nodes and links but much fewer link
types than the movie data. Since our path-type features are
constructed by permuting and composing sequences of
relations, the HEP-Th data set is a denser data set with more
points and fewer features compared to the movie data set.
In a dense data set, zero/nonzero separation might
generally not be as useful, since we need more precise
information to explain the uniqueness of a node.
Tables 7 and 8 present some examples of abnormal
movies, directors, and actors generated from the KDD
Movie data set. In these examples, we use the explanation
mechanism itself to determine who is abnormal. To do that,
UNICORN first generates the semantic profile for each
node and then applies the explanation mechanism to
explain them. Based on the explanations, we assign each
node into one of two groups, the abnormal group and the
not-so-abnormal group. A node belongs to the abnormal
group if UNICORN can explain its uniqueness by three or
fewer features using zero/nonzero separation; otherwise, it
will be assigned to the not-so-abnormal group. The example
nodes shown have been randomly picked from the
abnormal group.
Note that given a semantic profile, our explanation
system can explain not only abnormal nodes but also not-
so-abnormal nodes. For example
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TABLE 5
Two Types of Explanations for Hitchcock in the Movie Data
TABLE 6
Two Types of Explanations for an Abnormal Researcher
in the High-Energy Physics Data
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contains 10,917 candidates) that
. produced some movie,
. directed some movie, and
. never is the writer of some movie.
In this case, the best our system can do based on three
zero/nonzero features is to separate the nodes from the
other ð10;917   48 ¼ 10;869Þ nodes. In other words, there is
still a group of 47 actors that are similar to Anderson. This
example demonstrates that our explanation system can be
used to generate explanations for every node regardless of
whether it is unique or not. Moreover, the structure and size
of explanations reveals the degree of abnormality of the
nodes.
7R ELATED WORK
7.1 Network Analysis for Homeland Security and
Crime
In general, intelligent graph analysis methods have become
popularto solveproblemsinhomelandsecurity[3], [20],[21]
and crime mining [22], [23]. For semantic graphs, Adibi et al.
[18] describe a method combining a knowledge-based
system with MI analysis to identify threat groups given a
set of seeds. Krebs [5] applied SNA to the 9/11 terrorists
network and suggested that to identify covert individuals; it
is preferable to utilize multiple types of relational informa-
tion to uncover the hidden connections in evidence. This
conclusion echoes our decision of performing discovery on
top of a multirelational semantic graph. There are also link
discovery and analysis algorithms proposed to predict
missing links in graphs or relational data sets [24], [25].
Recently, several general frameworks have been proposed to
model and analyze semantic graphs such as relational
Bayesian networks, relational Markov networks, and rela-
tional dependency networks [26], [27], [28]. However, these
frameworks aim at exploiting the graph structure to learn
the dependency (that is, joint probability) or the posterior
probability of events (nodes) or relations between them
based on training examples. Our goal is very different, since
we are focusing on identifying abnormal instances without
introducing any training bias. Moreover, we also want to be
able to generate human-understandable explanations for the
system’s findings.
7.2 Interesting Instance Discovery
The first part of our work (that is, identifying abnormal
nodes) is closely related to our previous work on discover-
ing various types of interesting instances in MRNs. In [29],
we propose a rarity-based mechanism to identify interest-
ing paths in a semantic graph. This paper proposed four
different similarity measures for paths in the network and
use rarity as a measurement to identify interesting ones. In
our 2003 KDD Cup participation [30], we applied both
rarity-based and abnormality-based methods to the HEP-Th
bibliography data to find interesting entities based on their
loop contributions. The first part of this paper can be seen as
a generalized version of these algorithms. In [12], we
addressed issues of verification for such unsupervised
instance discovery systems, which eventually lead to the
development of the explanation-based discovery system
described in Section 3.
7.3 Social Network Analysis
Social networks consist of a finite set of actors (nodes) and
the binary ties (links) defined between them. The goal of
SNA is, in a nutshell, to provide better understanding of the
structure of a given network [16]. Although most of the
analyses are focused on finding social patterns and
subgroups, there are a small number of SNA tasks
resembling our instance discovery problem. Centrality
analysis aims at identifying important instances in the
network based on their connectivity with others: An actor is
important if it possesses a high node degree (degree
centrality) or is close to other nodes (closeness centrality).
An actor is importantly connected to two source actors if it
is involved in many connections between them (between-
ness and information centrality). The major difference
between centrality analysis and our approach is that we
are trying to model suspiciousness by abnormality instead
of centrality or prestige. Social positions analysis targets
finding individuals who are similarly embedded in net-
works of relations. The similarity between actors is
measured by whether they have similar ties with other
actors. We generalize this concept by using paths and their
statistical contributions. The generalized path features and
their relative frequency of occurrence allow us to exploit
more information from the network to capture the deeper
meanings of instances.
Another main difference between the problems SNA
handles and our problem is that most of the SNA
approaches are designed to handle only one-mode or
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Examples of Abnormal Movies from the Movie Data
TABLE 8
Examples of Abnormal Directors from the Movie Data
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actors) [16], whereas such a limitation does not exist in our
analysis. Moreover, existing statistical and graph-theoreti-
cal methods for centrality, position, and role analysis do not
distinguish between different link types and their different
semantics, which limits their usage in more complicated
networks, as demonstrated by our experiments. The
relational networks we are dealing with are also not limited
to social networks. They can be any relational graph, for
example, a thesaurus such as WordNet. Finally, SNA does
not address the problem of automatically generating hu-
man-understandable explanations for its results.
7.4 Relational Data Mining
Relational data mining (RDM) deals with mining of
relational tables in a database. It is related to our problem
in the sense that an MRN is a type of relational data and can
be translated into relational tables. RDM searches a
language of relational patterns to find patterns that are
valid in a given relational database [31]. Morik [32]
proposes a way to find interesting instances in this
relational domain by first learning rules and then searching
for the instances that satisfy one of the following three
criteria: exceptions to an accepted given rule, not being
covered by any rule, and negative examples that prevent
the acceptance of a rule. Angiulli et al. propose a similar
idea by using default logic to screen out the outliers [33].
Both methods require a certain amount of domain knowl-
edge or training examples for supervised learning, which
makes them different from ours, since we prefer to discover
abnormal instances that are not expected by users nor
biased by training data. There is, however, one type of
unsupervised discovery problem called interesting sub-
group discovery that tries to discover subsets that are
unusual [34], [35], [36]. For example, interesting subsets are
those whose distribution of instances based on a certain
objective function is different from that of the whole data
set. The major difference between our problem and
subgroup discovery is that we are not looking for groups
but individual instances; thus, the concept of abnormal
statistical distribution is not directly applicable.
7.5 Outlier Explanation
There is a small amount of prior work on outlier
explanation. For distribution-based outliers, Yamanishi
and Takeuchi propose to combine statistical methods with
supervised methods to generate outliers [37]. The statistical
method is first applied to learn the data distribution and
then to identify the outliers. Once the outliers are detected,
the classification method can be applied to extract the
filtering rules as explanation. Their approach is suitable for
a situation where the distribution is known but not for a
distance-based scenario in which the outliers could be very
diverse. The idea of applying a classification method for
explanation is similar to our explanation system. The key
differences are that we can introduce an additional
reference class in the explanation (see [10]) and that we
treat each outlier separately. Furthermore, we translate the
relevant features and their values into natural language.
Yao et al. propose to apply a classification method to
generate explanations for association rules. Their system
utilizes external information that was not used in associa-
tion-rule mining to generate the condition in which the
rules hold [38], [39]. The external information, however, is
not accessible in our problem.
8C ONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we described a general unsupervised frame-
work for identifying abnormal individuals in large complex
semantic graphs. Our first contribution is the development
of a novel framework called UNICORN, which can
summarize the semantics of nodes into propositional
semantic profiles. Given such profiles, we can compare
and contrast nodes and exploit distance-based outlier
algorithms to identify abnormal and suspicious nodes.
Since the method is unsupervised and does not require
training examples or user-defined features, it has the
potential to discover truly novel instances without being
biased by human analysts or training examples. Never-
theless, the process of selecting which relationships to use
and creating a semantic graph can introduce some bias.
Therefore, our general recommendation is to include as
much information as possible and to let UNICORN’s
modeling and explanation mechanism determine which
evidence (path) is important and which is not.
Motivated by issues of verification and the danger posed
by false positives that might mistakenly incriminate in-
nocent individuals, our system needs to not only identify
suspicious nodes but also be able to explain to an analyst
why they were chosen. To this end, we designed and
implemented a novel explanation mechanism to produce
natural language explanations for abnormal nodes, which is
the second major contribution of this paper. The experi-
ments show that our system outperforms several state-of-
the-art network algorithms in terms of identifying abnormal
nodes in a complex synthetic data set about organized
crime. In an experiment with human subjects, we demon-
strate that the explanation system can significantly improve
the result quality, confidence, and efficiency of the subjects
when analyzing a complex data set. Our application section
demonstrates that the UNICORN framework is domain
independent and can be applied not only to identify
abnormal instances in crime and intelligence data sets but
also to find such interesting instances in any MRN with a
variety of potential applications in scientific discovery and
data analysis.
Our algorithms have been successfully applied to net-
works with over 40,000 nodes and 475,000 links, which can
be analyzed in under 2 minutes on a standard PC-based
workstation. However, an important future direction is to
further improve the scalability of the system. What is most
expensive is the computation of feature values, since it
requires the system to count a potentially large number of
paths. We are currently investigating different sampling
methods to approximate these values, which should enable
us to further improve UNICORN’s scalability.
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